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This article briefly summarizes keydevelopments in formulaic language research
over the past 5 years, before exploring certain assumptions typically made,
regarding the coherence of formulaicity as a phenomenon, the significance of
frequency as aproperty, and the locationof subtypesof formulaic language along
various continua. It is argued that we do not yet have the full measure of how
different features associated with formulaicity fit together. The challenge lies in
reconciling the range of evidence types within an explanation that is rooted not
only in usage itself, but in the underlying motivations that determine usage.
Now is a good time to take stock of formulaic language research. It is nearly
30 years since Pawley and Syder (1983) asked how native speakers success-
fully select the subset of grammatical constructions that are also idiomatic and
produce language so fluently. Their answer was that a key aspect of nativelike
linguistic knowledge is the mastery of many multiword sentences and partly
lexicalized sentence stems, easily selected and easily chained to create fluent
idiomatic output. Five years later, Sinclair (1987) proposed thatwhenweprocess
language we apply the idiom principle before the open choice principle—that is,
we look for opportunities to map form to meaning at the multiword level if
we can and break wordstrings down only if necessary. In the same year, Van
Lancker (1987) published her excellent review of patterns of formulaic language
in aphasia, raising the question of how the way we learn and use language might
influence what remains after brain damage.
Ten years ago, I proposed that a single, fairly simple principle underlies
formulaic language across its range of forms and domains: It is a linguistic
solution to the problem of how to promote our own survival interests (Wray,
2002). Humans, being psychologically and socially complex, are unable fully to
meet their emotional, mental, and physical needs without involving others. One
effective tool for drawing others into behaviors beneficial to us is to employ
wordstrings that are in current use in our community. They enable us socially
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to align ourselves with others (I am like you because I talk like you, so you will
want to help me), and as a way of minimizing the risk of misunderstanding, since
wordstrings or partly lexicalized frames that have their own semantic entry
require less decoding.
As I shall briefly outline here, research activity around formulaic language
seems to have increased considerably in the past decade. And within the body
of the most recent research (much of which is reviewed in other articles in this
volume), I perceive a significant shift in focus and emphasis, in which new kinds
of questions are either directly posed or indirectly emerging. I shall examine
the significance of these new trends in relation to what we assume and believe
about formulaic language. The overall thrust of my exploration entails prob-
lematizing some of our basic assumptions and ground rules at the interface of
different types of evidence. Formulaicity is an inherently complex phenomenon.
My question is, how much additional complexity arises from the way we are
conceptualizing it?
Before entering this discussion, we need to take a step back and consider the
general patterns into which the recent research into formulaic language falls, so
as to understand what sorts of claims might be affected by the assumptions I
will be challenging.
THE SCOPE OF RECENT FORMULAIC LANGUAGE
There has long been an interest in formulaic language across a number of differ-
ent domains of enquiry, including psycholinguistics, discourse analysis, phrase-
ology, historical linguistics, corpus linguistics, grammar, first language (L1) ac-
quisition, second language (L2) acquisition, clinical linguistics, computational
linguistics, and others (seeWray, 2002). But in the past 10 years or so, something
about formulaicity as a property of language has captured researchers’ imagi-
nation, and there seems to have been an explosion of activity. One sign of it is
the symposia and conferences organized around the theme, most notably the
phraseology conferences (and their resulting volumes) in Basel in 2004 (Ha¨cki
Buhofer & Burger, 2006, 2007) and in Louvain-la-Neuve in 2005 (Granger & Me-
unier, 2008; Meunier & Granger, 2008); the Wisconsin-Milwaukee Symposium
on Formulaic Language in 2007 (Corrigan, Moravcsik, Ouali, & Wheatley, 2009b,
2009c); the biennial international postgraduate conferences of the Formulaic
Language Research Network (FLaRN), most recently in Paderborn in 2010 and
Tilburg in 2012; and the first national Chinese conference on formulaic language
in Beijing in 2009. We can identify six main strands in current research activity
addressing the individual questions below.
How Can the Patterns of Formulaic Sequences Best Be Categorized?
With corpus methods the dominant approach to examining this question, there
is an impressive range of recent descriptive (e.g., Biber, 2009; Biber & Bar-
bieri, 2007) and explanatory studies. The latter aim to characterize observed
patterns of words in terms of underlying schemata of some sort, of which the
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observed instances are plausible examples. The dominant approach in such
schema-building is what is called usage-based. Usage-based grammatical models
“see grammar as a network built up from the categorized instances of language
use” (Beckner et al., 2009, p. 5) and thus interface effectively with the corpus-
basedmethods for identifying examples. Construction grammar is a particularly
powerful way of capturing key features of formulaic language, because it rec-
ognizes meaning as able to reside within grammatical frames as well as within
individual lexical items (see later section). (For extensive coverage of the latest
ideas in construction grammar, see Trousdale & Hoffman, 2012). There is also
increased interest in the semantic prosody of wordstrings (e.g., Culpeper, 2010;
Ellis & Frey, 2009; Ellis, Frey, & Jalkanen, 2009; Wierzbicka, 2009), and in new and
more sophisticated ways to capture the essence of collocation (Cheng, Greaves,
Sinclair, &Warren, 2009). Some of the issues raised in these works are discussed
later in this article.
What Do Native Speakers Know About Formulaic Sequences and How Do
They Know It?
Again, usage-based models make a major contribution to answering this ques-
tion, offering evidence for how children’s natural exposure to language input
could result in sensitivity to idiomaticity, as a consequence of frequency of
exposure to patterns (e.g., Abbot-Smith & Tomasello, 2006; Bannard & Lieven,
2009). The argument (Wray, 2002, 2008) that frequency is not enough to explain
this knowledge (discussed later) is partly addressed by taking into account role
of attention, noticing, and saliency (Beckner et al., 2009; Dominey & Dodane,
2004; Ellis, 2006; Huang, 2009; Kurumada, 2009; Merritt, DeLosh, & McDaniel,
2006; Perruchet & Peereman, 2004; Wray & Fitzpatrick, 2008).
How Are Formulaic Sequences Processed?
Earlier assertions regarding the holistic processing of formulaic language (for an
overview, see Wray, 2002) have become increasingly anchored in neurological
evidence. A range of investigations confirm that formulaic sequences (or at
least some types of them—see later discussion) do seem to have a privileged
processing status. Reaction time tasks (e.g., Conklin & Schmitt, 2008; Jiang &
Nekrasova, 2007; Libben & Titone, 2008), self-paced reading (e.g., Tremblay,
Derwing, Libben, & Westbury, 2011), and controlled recall (Tremblay & Baayen,
2010) are now often combined with physical measures such as eye gaze (e.g.,
Millar, 2011; Siyanova-Chanturia, Conklin, & Schmitt, 2011; Siyanova-Chanturia,
Conklin, & van Heuven, 2011), EEG recordings (e.g., Tremblay & Baayen, 2010),
or MEG measurements (e.g. Cappelle, Shtyrov, & Pulvermu¨ller, 2010). The pro-
posal that fast-processing leads to changes in pronunciation (for a review, see
Lin, 2010) has also led to explorations of ways to extract formulaic sequences
automatically from spoken corpora (e.g., Strik, Hulsbosch, & Cucchiarini, 2010).
There nevertheless remain important issues to address. One is the question
of whether a processing advantage in terms of speed indicates holistic storage or
simply the faster mapping of components—and indeed whether these are really
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two different things or just different ways of conceptualizing the same thing. The
notion of holistic storage could be viewed as a device for talking about linguistic
units that are ring-fenced for speedy processing—at the level of articulation, this
must presumably be the case. On the other hand, there is potentially a different
quality to holistic storage and access. First, it could entail the synchronous
access of all components—as Tremblay and Baayen (2010) proposed as the
best explanation for their results. Second, it could entail accessing (albeit in
sequence) larger base components, through a direct mapping from the meaning
of the entire expression to the phonological form (of those parts that are reliably
fixed—as construction models might favor). Third, in the case of wordstrings
that have become fused through repeated use, it could entail the creation of
a new access pathway that bypasses the original componential route—as the
extensive neurological research into automatic processing indicates. He´lie and
Cousineau (2011) explored a range of evidence for which parts of the brain are
involved in these processes, including the regions responsible for learning novel
behaviors, and the transfer of control from one brain area to another once the
action is automatic (see also Graybiel, 2008).
There remains for the present a significant gulf between the fine-grained ob-
servations of most neuroscientists, whose experimental tasks tend to be very
simple compared with the comprehension and production of real language, and
the language-driven investigations that open a more opaque window onto neu-
rological processes. With new technologies, and ever increasing opportunities
for interdisciplinary collaboration, we can hope in future to see more research
that directly investigates language in use from the experimental neurological
perspective.
What Effect Do Formulaic Sequences Have on the Shape of Languages?
At one level this question underpins the entire development of interest in formu-
laic language. Human languageswithout formulaic sequenceswould, we assume,
lack idiomaticity, a considerable measure of the predictability that foregrounds
what is most useful, and many layers of subtlety associated with how speakers
and hearers apply the components of the language to real situations. In that
sense, we have long been saying that formulaicity shapes languages.
However, formulaicity seems to exercise its own dynamic force on the shape
of languages, as most powerfully exemplified in the assertion that it is the cause
of the emergence of grammar (Booij, 2010; Bybee, 2003; Bybee & Cacoullos,
2009). The proposal is that when content words with their own discrete mean-
ings are located in strings that are used often, they can undergo changes in
pronunciation that weaken their indexation back to the isolated form. Over
time, they become associated with a meaning that derives more holistically
from the string as a whole, so that they are perceived to have a grammatical role.
Beckner et al. (2009) concisely illustrated the process with be going to, which
only a few centuries ago centrally entailed a meaning of physical movement,
with the meaning of future intention only implied.
Grammaticization is a bottleneck whereby processing a wordstring holisti-
cally (or at least repeatedly and very fast) reduces the user’s awareness of the
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discrete components, but yet later does not prevent the reanalysis of the whole
into (a new set of) parts. Peters (2009) developed this theme further in the
context of first language acquisition, noting that since the contents of formulaic
sequences are often already grammaticized when children encounter them, part
of the child’s job is to “recover . . . embedded morphemes and grammar . . . [in]
a kind of reverse of grammaticization” (p. 403).
The processes revealed through research into grammaticization are tanta-
lizing, not least in inevitably tending to rely on post hoc evidence. Much more
difficult—though perhaps not impossible given modern corpora—is observing
changes while they are happening and exploring such questions as what con-
tributes to the establishment of the threshold at which something becomes
reanalyzed: If there were a uniform potential for leakage out of a fossilizing
wordstring, then the older meaning would presumably continue to reestablish
itself. Humans’ capacity to tolerate alternative, and often effectively interchange-
able, lexical and grammatical meanings (e.g., he’s tired meaning he is in a state
of tiredness and he has become tired) further invites consideration of how we
can reliably interpret data during the period of transition from a lexical to a
grammatical meaning.
Formulaic language is implicated in language change in other types of study
too. For instance, Lancioni (2009) suggested that the forms of reconstructed
Classical Arabic were distorted through the use of highly formulaic pre-Islamic
texts (poetic material from the oral tradition) as a resource to supplement the
limited content of the Quran.
How Do Formulaic Sequences Impact on Second/Foreign
Language Learning?
A set of related questions can be posed: What patterns of formulaic sequences
are known or not known by postchildhood language learners? How can the
learning of them be improved? Which ones should be taught? Without question,
the greatest amount of empirical research activity into formulaic sequences
over the past few years has been in the domain of postchildhood L2 and for-
eign language learning. The reports, exemplified by many of the articles in the
edited collections of Granger and Meunier (2008), Meunier and Granger (2008),
Corrigan et al. (2009b, 2009c), and Wood (2010), and often drawing on extensive
learner corpora, reveal that learners tend to have a small inventory of formu-
laic sequences that they overuse and often have limited sensitivity to register
differences (see other articles in this volume). Research has addressed how at-
tending to formulaic sequences can improve nativelikeness (Boers, Eyckmans,
Kappel, Stengers, & Demecheleer, 2006; Gardner & Davies, 2007; Lindstromberg
& Boers, 2008; Rott, 2009), the potential positive and negative role of deliberate
memorization (Ding, 2007;Qi&Ding, 2011;Wray&Fitzpatrick, 2008;Wray&Pegg,
2009), and rigorous approaches to identifying and teaching themost appropriate
wordstrings (e.g., Erman, 2009; Liu, 2010; Simpson-Vlach & Ellis, 2010).
Onequestion that is rarely addressedheadon is this: As native speakers of our
L1, we are evidently very tuned into the value of using multiword strings reliably
to express commonmeanings and achieve key interactional functions. Why then
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dowe not, as taught L2 learners, make a beeline for every opportunity to identify
mappings at the multiword level? My proposal (Wray, 2002, 2008) was that adult
learners need a sense of control over the language—perhaps largely as a result
of the culture of education in general, and the expectations, assumptions, and
requirements of language teaching in particular—but it remains puzzling why
any learner driven by pragmatism is not able to override this to a greater extent
than seems to be the case, so as to approach language learningmore holistically,
like the Papuan and New Britain learners described by Thurman and Laycock
(see Wray, 2008; Wray & Grace, 2007).
In short, we have an increasing body of evidence that instructed L2 learners
have an impoverished stock of formulaic expressions, and some indications from
psycholinguistic and neurological measurements that aspects of the processing
are different in L2 learners (e.g., Ellis, Simpson-Vlach, &Maynard, 2008; Siyanova-
Chanturia, Conklin, & Schmitt, 2011; Tremblay & Baayen, 2010; Tremblay et al.,
2011). What we lack still is firm evidence about why. The role of noticing and
salience offers some pointers (see discussion later in this article), but I still
perceive a missing link regarding why learners do not feel more empowered to
harvest L2 input in larger chunks in the pursuit of painless routes to effective
communication.
What Effect Do Formulaic Sequences Have on the Shape of Our Interaction?
In the context of academic writing, Kerz and Haas (2009) proposed that “the
relatively high standardization of the academic way of representing facts” leads
to “a reduction in the number of linguistic constructions used for realizations of
contents typical of academic texts” (p. 98). Over time, they suggest, researchers
learn to model their research activity around the accepted shape of the dis-
course. Wray and Grace (2007) propose that language forms stretch and retract
in response to the behavior of a community of speakers—particularly how they
interact with outsiders. Formulaic language marks insider status, protecting the
identity of linguistic groups, but forms are regularized to increase transparency
if the exclusion of outsiders becomes socially or economically undesirable. In
this way, the amount and impenetrability of formulaic material in a language
both reflects and influences the amount of interaction the speakers have with
outsiders, particularly where there is an option to use a lingua franca instead.
Descriptions of formulaicity gain new power when one asks how one might
seek to manipulate conditions to achieve a more favorable use or knowledge of
language. Work by Davis and colleagues (Davis, 2006, 2007; Davis & Maclagan,
2007, 2010), supplemented recently by some of my own (Lindholm&Wray, 2011;
Wray, 2010, 2011) explores how formulaic sequences can variously diminish or
enhance communication by and with people with Alzheimer’s disease (AD). The
tendency of people with AD to repeat information, often in the same or a similar
form time after time, can easily elicit a negative response from carers, who
may then adopt their own set of formulaic responses as a means of distancing
themselves emotionally from this stressful and potentially hurtful situation. The
challenge, addressed by Davis’s team and in the practical interventions of Clegg
(2010), is to use formulaic language as a tool for opening up communication
EVALUATION OF THE CURRENT STATE OF PLAY 237
rather than closing it down, thus supporting not only the people with AD but
also their caregivers in achieving a more satisfactory and rewarding level of
interaction.
In a quite different sphere, Gruber (2009) showed how defendants in court
can come across as insincere when they use formulaic expressions of regret, so
that “more creative, less formulaic utterances might better serve defendants’
communicative goals at sentencing” (p. 599). Gruber cited a number of previous
studies in other settings that have also demonstrated “a palpable link in Amer-
ican culture between the perception of more creative language and speaker
sincerity in the performance of expressive speech acts” (p. 600).
So far, so good. There has been plenty of research activity, and as a result
we are making good progress in building up a body of reliable knowledge about
formulaic language. Aren’t we?
HOW MANY ELEPHANTS?
There is enough contrast in the research already described for it to be evident
that different researchers are not all talking about precisely the same thing.What
is less clear is what this observation signifies. In the preface to their twin edited
volumes, Corrigan, Moravcsik, Ouali, and Wheatley (2009a) grappled with the
unity of formulaic language. Having offered an answer to the question “What are
formulae?”, they concede that “the formulae discussed in the papers of [these]
book[s] actually vary in how closely they conform to the prototypes described
above” (p. xiv). Granger & Meunier (2008; also Meunier & Granger, 2008) faced
a similar challenge in introducing the many faces of phraseology.
Formulaicity may be the lens through which disparate pursuits make more
collective sense. Alternatively, we may simply be papering over cracks—even
chasms—between distinct endeavors. It could even be that, in some domains
at least, there has not been an increase in research activity at all, only a con-
vergence of what was previously undertaken in different places under different
headings, made one by the assembly of researchers at particular conferences
and within edited collections. If so, the interest in a common topic may be no
deeper than the (precipitate) adoption of a common terminology.
This article is too short to explore every aspect of this issue, so I will go
straight to what I perceive to be the heart of the matter—the ways in which
the empirical evidence from studies of how the brain processes language, and
from large corpus studies, are feeding into theoretical models of (aspects of)
formulaic language. It is common for researchers across the wider range of
empirical studies to hook their accounts onto key claims from these discussions,
sometimes in a rather piecemeal or superficial way. By drawing attention to the
central challenges for theory (and the opportunities—for I do not mean to level
undue criticism at the present work, only to indicate where it needs to go next),
I hope to encourage the wider community of researchers to consider more
critically the relevance and implications of any claims and models they adopt
from other domains, particularly if they are stripped of their detail and context
in the process.
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Fig. 1. The complex discussion space of current research into formulaic language.
In the course of undertaking the reading for this article, I examined how
recent published studies on formulaic language were explicitly or implicitly con-
ceptualizing the relationship between certain features typically associated with
formulaicity. I wanted to understand how researchers with different priorities
and approaches were dividing up, and prioritizing and deprioritizing aspects of,
the so-called discussion space in which our assembled accounts are located. In
particular, I was interested in how researchers made links between concepts in
their discussion—what aspects or realizations of formulaic language did they
refer to when describing or explaining their primary focus of interest? It was not
a scientific trawl, and my purpose in presenting it here is purely illustrative.
The diagram I came up with (Figure 1) is alarmingly complicated.1,2 The lines
in Figure 1 join the features that commentators have linked in their narrative
or study design. In some cases the links are empirically based—for instance,
when collocations are defined in terms of an aspect of the frequency of their
co-occurrence. But in other cases, the links are inferred by authors on the basis
of other evidence or are simply assumptions, and this is potentially problematic.
Often a link is appropriate for some types of formulaic sequence but not (or not
demonstrably) so for others. For instance, it is often asserted that formulaic
sequences are located on a continuum, but continua can be based on different
dimensions of variation that are not evidently directly related (e.g., semantic
transparency, formality, frequency) as discussed later.
As with any such diagram, much may be learned from what is not linked.
However, we need to consider under what circumstances features that are not
directly linked can be viewed as linked via another feature. For instance, if one
(type of) researcher links frequency and context/salience, and another links
frequency and collocation, can we infer that collocation and context/salience
are linked? The answer depends on a number of considerations regarding the
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relationships between the features. But it also will depend onwhether frequency
is really the same thing in both cases. Inherent, and inevitable, constraints
on the types of example that can be used in particular research designs are
one impediment to certainty about this. Another, arguably more tractable, is
precision in the definition of key terms—something that requires not just general
care and thoroughness, but also the kind of circumspection only possible from
knowing how others, with very different research interests and foci, might want
to make links across domains.
To put all of this another way, we can rather easily assume that formulaic
language is like the elephant differently described by blind men with access to
different parts of its huge mass. We may imagine that in due course our work
will join up and we will grasp the nature of the whole beast. But the point of
the metaphor is that the blind men don’t know if they are in fact describing
aspects of the same thing, because they can’t see the elephant. And we, for the
moment at least, cannot necessarily assume that there is a single phenomenon
at the heart of our different activities, or if there is, that there are not also a few
small rodents skulking about in the room too, confusing the description of the
elephant and, perhaps, also influencing how it behaves. We can describe what
we find, and call it formulaic language. But the elephant in the room is that we
do not know if there is just one elephant in the room.
In the following sections I home in on some subparts of the complex space
depicted in Figure 1, to attempt to tease apart what we really know from what
we perhaps only believe we know. I have selected two groups of linked concepts
from the diagram. These particular sets enable me to make some observations
about our current knowledge, approaches, and assumptions, which may be of
value in navigating the often confusing claims in formulaic language research.
Continua, Processing, Frequency, and Salience
Should we construe an expression as either formulaic or nonformulaic? Or are
there degrees of formulaicity, with expressions located at any point along a con-
tinuum from entirely formulaic to entirely nonformulaic? The dual processing
explanations offered by Van Lancker (1987; Van Lancker Sidtis, 2009), Sinclair
(1987, 1991), and others, including inmy own earlier work (e.g.,Wray, 1999, 2000,
2002; Wray & Perkins, 2000), strongly suggest a clear difference in kind between
formulaic and nonformulaic processing, and this view is supported by some of
the accounts of neurological pathways, as mentioned earlier in this article. On
the other hand, other kinds of evidence, including frequency data, are much
more in keeping with a continuum, and most formulaic sequences themselves
have properties that seem to locate them somewhere between two extremes:
While some formulaic sequences are entirely impenetrable (e.g., hocus pocus, by
and large) and others entirely transparent (e.g., have a nice day), many partly
map onto a relevant meaning (e.g., all of a sudden) or are literally obscure but
can be mapped word by word onto their meaning at a metaphorical level (e.g.,
spill the beans).
A problem for our research is that, in order to establish answers to specific
empirical questions, we need clear examples of formulaic and nonformulaic
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wordstrings. But even if we were comfortable that language users store the
same items formulaically—which psycholinguistically motivated explanations
will not guarantee—how safe can our assumptions be about what observations
based on extreme types tell us about other kinds of examples? The challenge
can be illustrated using the study by Conklin and Schmitt (2008), who asked,
“Are formulaic sequences read more quickly than equivalent non-formulaic se-
quences?” (p. 80). Their experiment compared reading speeds for wordstrings
that can have an idiomatic or literal reading, (e.g., take the bull by the horns).
They located thewordstrings in contexts that directed the reader to one or other
interpretation and found that the idiom interpretation was read more quickly.
But which other kinds of formulaic sequences can we assume this finding also
applies to, and why? We can infer from their discussion that they see idioms
as a reliable type of formulaic language, able to provide evidence relevant to a
wider range of types. However, since idioms have holistic meanings that require
their own semantic entry, perhaps this is why they are processed faster. We can
assume, at least, that it is not on account of frequency, since true idioms tend
not to be all that frequent (Moon, 1998).
Yet frequency evidently does play a role in processing, as Ellis’s review (this
volume) amply attests. Tremblay et al. (2011) found that sentences containing
lexical bundles, such as in themiddle of the, were processed faster andweremore
accurately recalled than matched sentences containing less frequent strings,
such as in the front of the. In another investigation by the same team, Trem-
blay and Baayen (2010) showed participants blocks of six four-word strings of
varying frequency in the British National Corpus, and then asked them to recall
them as accurately as possible. They found a frequency effect and, by virtue
of electroencephalograph (EEG) measurements, concluded that “phrasal and
non-phrasal four-word sequences leave memory traces in the brain” (p. 170).
They suggest that the loci of activation peaks and the speed of activation were
consistent with holistic recognition for the most frequent strings.
So, both infrequent idioms and frequent lexical bundles seem to have some
sort of processing advantage. Neither a continuum model of formulaicity that is
based only on compositionality nor one based only on frequency is adequate
to explain both. Are there two continua? If so, how do they relate to each
other? If they intersect (as illustrated in Figure 2), we can predict that frequent
noncompositionalwordstrings (such as the names of prominent people) are fast-
processed, while infrequent, compositional wordstrings (as classically used as
the control stimuli in experiments on both lexical bundles and idioms) are not.
However, new questions also arise.
Unpacking the Continua
In Figure 2, we should anticipate that commonly used proper names are pro-
cessed faster than either lexical bundles or idioms, since they benefit from both
frequency and noncompositionality effects. I am not aware of research into this
question, though it could be easily done. There is also the question of what lies
partway along each continuum. What should we predict about fairly frequent
or fairly compositional wordstrings? Are they processed fairly fast? Do both
continua contribute at an equal rate to the processing speed? Alternatively, if
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Fig. 2. Fast (or holistic) processing on two axes.
frequent use results in a new processing route in the brain (He´lie & Cousineau,
2011), can we observe the buildup to reaching that threshold and a change in
response behavior once the threshold is crossed?
A secondary question, easily missed by those whose own work does not in-
volve frequencymeasures but who are tempted to adopt the idea that frequency
is a (or the) significant variable in formulaicity, is how frequency itself is to be
defined in the context of fast-processing. Ellis et al. (2008) found that the process-
ing speed of native speakers was more sensitive to the mutual information (MI)
score of the words in a string than to the raw frequency of the string as a whole.3
The implication is that MI is a more sophisticated index of a user’s capacity to
predict what comes next in a text than raw frequency is. But they found it was
not as influential in nonnative speakers as native speakers. What explains the
difference? It could be the reduced quantity of exposure that nonnative speakers
have had to texts, or it could be an interacting variable, such as assumptions
brought to the interpretation of an L2 on the basis of what is known about the
L1 (Beckner et al., 2009), that might influence salience, as discussed later.
Interacting Continua
Figure 2 depicts infrequent, compositional wordstrings as not being formulaic,
justifying their suitability as controls in experiments. Given the consistency in
contrasts between such controls and the items identified as formulaic, it would
be difficult to argue that it is wrong to use such items for the purpose. Nor is it
really a problem if some such items are in fact formulaic for a given participant,
which they might be, since we all have our own inventories. For instance, at the
end of the war, used as a control by Siyanova et al. (2011), might happen to be the
title of a play one took part in at school. Researchers can accept such variation
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as noise. It will reduce the overall contrast between the test and control item
sets, and thus help strengthen confidence in a significant finding of difference.
Theproblem, if there is one, arises ifwebecomeaware thatwe aredealingwith
somethingmore systematic—organized noise. The intersection of the frequency
and compositionality continua in Figure 2 isolates a quadrant of types that
are not seen as formulaic (and thus predicted not to be fast-processed). But
another intersecting continuum could subdivide that quadrant, so that only
some of the examples are still seen as definitely nonformulaic. Another could
subdivide it again. It is not just that each such division reduces the number of
possible examples—it is that it forces judgments about the relative importance
of different variables and creates challenges for how one is to track or control
for them. For instance, knowing what is in an L2 learner’s personal inventory of
formulaic expressions is surely likely to be a crucial determinant of how they
respond to stimuli, yet it is difficult to accommodate adequately in a research
design. In a current study, Huw Bell and I are using formulaic expressions from
the Regency period (ca. 1800), as employed by Georgette Heyer in her historical
novels, to minimize the variable of previous knowledge so that we can research
how learners and native speakers figure out the meaning of formulaic sequences
they have never seen before (Bell & Wray, 2011).
There are several other possible axes of variation to consider. Recent expli-
cations of how fluent and/or automatic language is processed (Graybiel, 2008;
Paradis, 2009; Segalowitz, 2010) (continue to) distinguish between implicit and
explicit learning, and procedural and declarative knowledge. Idioms might be
subject to explicit learning (Grant & Bauer, 2004), even in native speakers, since
the nonalignment of form and meaning, combined with the rarity of occurrence,
must certainly draw attention. What we would have here is privileged process-
ing on account of salience. An idiom is salient because its form is strikingly
associated with its encoded meaning, so that even though it is not frequent,
it is easily recognized and retrieved (Huang, 2009). As Ellis and Simpson-Vlach
(2009) observed:
Sequences such as on the other hand and at the same time are more
psycholinguistically salient than sequences such as to do with the, or
I think it was, even though their frequency profiles may put them on
equivalent lists. (p. 64)
Nesi and Basturkmen (2006) contrasted frequency and salience:
Lexical bundles that occur with very high frequency across a range
of texts are likely to be stored in memory as unanalyzed chunks, a
particularly interesting consideration in view of the fact that bundles
tend to bridge syntactic boundaries and do not generally have idiomatic
meaning, and are therefore not very salient, either to the listener/reader
or to the language researcher. (p. 286)
Some research has suggested that salience can outrank frequency effects in
cognitive tasks. Merritt et al. (2006) found that in mixed lists of high and low
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frequency words, the latter were better recalled, because they “attract more
attention” (p. 1615). Setting aside the difference between speed of recall and
accuracy of recall for a moment, this implies that one could observe processing
advantages for frequent items compared with less frequent ones if the latter are
not salient, aswell as for salient items that are not frequent, as Ellis (2006), partic-
ularly concerned with perceptual salience, suggested. So is there a continuum of
salience? If so, it is not necessarily one onwhich examples canbepermanently lo-
cated, for salience can be created temporarily by the context too (Huang, 2009).
A further potential complication is raised by Ellis (2006), who suggested that
function words embedded in fossilized wordstrings have low salience so that,
even though they are of high frequency in themselves (and occur in high fre-
quency strings), they are difficult to notice. It would be for this reason that L2
learners struggle with the fine morphological detail of a target language (see
also Beckner et al., 2009). A study by Wray and Fitzpatrick (2008) supports
this position. We explored the patterns observed in the inaccurate recall by
L2 speakers of deliberately memorized sentences and proposed that deviations
from the original can reflect unconscious judgments during memorization about
what needs to be attended to. These judgments are based on an assessment of
the likelihood that an underspecifiedmemory can be reconstructed reliably, and
they represent a legitimate strategy used also by native speakers, but one that
will backfire for nonnative speakers if the risk assessment is based on receptive
rather than productive knowledge.
The question of low salience in frequent strings raises a question regard-
ing part of Tremblay and Baayen’s (2010) study, described earlier. They asked
participants to do a free recall task of lexical bundles of different frequencies:
“Our main interest here was to determine whether the number of times a se-
quence would be correctly recalled varied as a function of whole-string fre-
quency/probability” (p. 156). Only an exact replication was counted as correct,
and the examples they give of what would be counted as incorrect all involve the
omission or substitution of what, in Ellis’s terms, would be low salience functors.
It may be that this simply sliced their data without fundamentally affecting their
results—a frequency effect for accuracy of recall. However, they themselves
expressed surprise at this finding, on account of Merritt et al.’s (2006) work, just
described, which invoked salience as a variable. It may therefore be of some
significance if the items identified as fast-processed on account of frequency
were the subset with least incidence of low salience.
A different kind of continuum was discussed by Wulff (in press) in relation to
construction grammar. She contrasted idiomatization anddelexicalization—that
is, the extent to which a construction is fully lexicalized or has been abstracted
out to contain gaps allowing a range of alternatives. She quickly encountered
problemswith the one-dimensionalmodel and proposed that “the constructicon
could be extended by a horizontal axis . . . which cuts across the range of the
vertical axis where fully lexically specified complex constructions are located”
(p. 18). This approach raises an interesting issue. Bisecting one continuum in a
specific place, even to accommodate another, potentially challenges the status
of the first continuum—what falls immediately above and below that locus of the
“fully lexically specified complex construction” (p. 18)? Are lexical realizations
244 ALISON WRAY
in constructions a hard enough fact to require a punctuated, rather than entirely
gradual, continuum? Where on the continuum should we place constructions
with optional gaps or the full lexicalization of, say, one or other of a small number
of alternatives (as with I haven’t the faintest/foggiest [idea]; Tucker, 1996)?
Wulff’s account does not end with a two-way intersection. Noting that “differ-
ent factors like lexical specification, semantic irregularity, syntactic irregularity,
and cognitive entrenchment prevail at all levels of the constructicon in different
shades of prominence and relative importance,” she proposed that, since “any
given (schematic) idiom can be characterized individually along every single
factor,” we must recognize “a ‘multi-dimensional continuum’ of differently for-
mally and semantically irregular and cognitively entrenched expressions that
ultimately blurs the boundaries of idiom types” (p. 7). A multidimensional con-
tinuum certainly has merit over a one-dimensional one with different types
of property laid along it, as critically discussed in Wray (2002), but now our
attention has been drawn to complex adaptive systems (Beckner et al., 2009;
Larsen-Freeman & Cameron, 2008) and we can perhaps escape from the limita-
tions of linearity, other than where we are truly satisfied that enough of the path
has been mapped.
In sum,we see in the research literature explicit or implicit assumptions about
continua based on (at least) frequency (raw and MI), compositionality, salience,
and abstraction, with various levels of assertion or implication about how the
location of a wordstring upon themmight influence how it is processed. The risk
we run in designing classic bipolar experiments on a single axis is that we strip
out toomany other potential influences. It is not that experimental effects cannot
be found—they can. But I’m not convinced they are always being found for the
reasons we think. We may inadvertently be selecting from a smaller subset than
we realize, controlling, by virtue of procedural convenience, for a variablewe are
not considering. It does not matter, necessarily, for the particular experiment
in question, but it does matter when we attempt to generalize the claim beyond
the specific examples selected for testing, because we do not have a full picture
of where the lines are to be drawn.
And so far, we have barely touched on the question of communication—the
meanings we want to make, and the subtle judgments we need to engage in, so
as to make them effectively. When we stand at the bus stop, we do not jump on
the number 7 bus, irrespective of its destination, just because it comes more
frequently than the number 12, because it is painted in a brighter color, because
it goes via certain landmarks, or because it reminds us of journeys we have
taken on other buses. In the same way, we say the things we want and need
to say—sometimes things that are often said; sometimes things that are rarely
said; sometimes things that are remarkable to ourselves or others; sometimes
deliberately things that are not at all remarkable; sometimes things that could
be easily interpreted by someone unfamiliar with the formulation; sometimes
things that are impenetrable to all but an insider. Only once we have decided
what is important to say, do some or all of these other factors play a role in
how we say it. This may seem like a point too obvious to make, but it is all too
easy, in the interests of replicable science, to set aside, albeit inadvertently, an
adequate consideration of why the road less traveled exists at all.4
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Words, Collocations, Concgrams, Constructions, and Meaning Shift Units
The preceding discussion of frequency takes on particular significance in the
light of some recent attempts to (re)define just what the unit of interest to
researchers is. I want to explore aspects of the intricacy of word as a concept
in recent discussions, as it interfaces with accounts of collocational patterns,
phraseology, constructions, semantic prosody, and idiomaticity. I will use as the
pivot the relationship between claims in construction grammar and some ideas
emerging from the development of Sinclair’s unpublished work, as presented
by Cheng et al. (2009) in the context of opportunities afforded by concgram
analysis.
Formulaicity and Constructions
Formulaic language has become very productively associated with the new
generation of grammatical theories that locate multiword strings at the cen-
ter, rather than the periphery, of our linguistic experience (Ellis, 2008; Taylor,
2002). Cognitive, usage-driven grammatical models see patterns emerge from
the evidence of input, with abstractions derived from that evidence, rather
than being independently motivated by prespecified, innate linguistic knowl-
edge (Croft & Cruse, 2004). Construction grammar construes a language as
realizations of templates capable of containing syntactic, lexical, phonological
(including prosodic), semantic, and pragmatic information (Croft &Cruse, 2004).
The kinds of holistic information associated with formulaic language—from fully
fixed expressions to lexically unpopulated frames—are so integrated in this con-
ceptualization that, since “it’s constructions all the way down” (Goldberg, 2006,
p. 18), there is perhaps a sense in which it is also formulaicity all the way down.
In other words, perhaps everything we say is formulaic at one level or another,
from the single morpheme, through the range of typical formulaic expressions
such as idioms and routines, into collocations, and even onto completely novel
grammatical utterances that, although populated by unpredicted lexical items,
fall into abstract frames that provide semantic associations between the indi-
vidual words.
The effect of this possibility on howwe think of formulaic language is curious.
On the one hand, the idea that everything is built out of constructions is a very
close alternative to conceptualizing formulaic expressions as (holistically man-
aged) lexical entries. What we gain with construction grammar is the capacity
to set aside any logically possible wordstrings that are not idiomatic—this is a
very useful asset, because it solves the problem of overgeneration that has been
the keenest test of grammatical theories over many decades (Kay, 2012). On
the other hand, we may sense a flattening effect—a loss of perspective. “When
everyone is somebody, then no one’s anybody,” observed a character in Gilbert
& Sullivan’s The Gondoliers. What attracted our attention to formulaic language
was that certain wordstrings stood out as more formulaic than others, even
within the subset of those that are idiomatic.
Usage-based models most directly allow us to discriminate on the basis of
level of abstraction—for instance, in construction grammar, how much of a
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construction is lexically fixed—and on the basis of frequency. Although fre-
quency is sensitive to semantics, pragmatics, and cultural practice, there are
things we wanted to know that require a different dimension of digging: why
people with aphasia can produce some multiword strings and not others, why
some idiomatic wordstrings are easier for L2 learners tomaster than others, and
why some expressions are strongermarkers of social identity than others. These
considerations resonate with the earlier observation that frequency-based stud-
ies can easily miss taking full account of the social and psychological drivers
of human linguistic behavior. Again, here, I am not intending to criticize the
models for having the primary focus that they do, nor am I implying that their
proponents are ignorant of or ambivalent toward these dynamics of language.
It’s just that this is all very complicated. Perhaps the image of an elephant
should have been one of an octopus, which, each time you think you are starting
to contain it, throws out another tentacle and grabs tight to a factor you had
hoped to keep out of its reach.
Concgrams and Meaning Shift Units
Concgrams are “instances of co-occurring words irrespective of whether or not
they are contiguous, and irrespective of whether or not they are in the same
sequential order” (Cheng et al., 2009, p. 237). Cheng et al. gave the following
explanation:
[They] comprise all of the permutations of constituency variation, for
example AB (“work hard”) and A_B (“work very hard”), and positional
variation, for example AB (“work hard”) and BA (“hard work”), resulting
from the co-occurrence of two or more words within a wide span of up
to twelve words on either side of the “origin.” (p. 238)
Cheng et al. asserted that “examining concgrams takes us closer to more fully
appreciating and understanding the idiom principle” (p. 236), because it extends
the scope of patterns beyond the more linear arrangements of n-gram lists.
Cheng et al. (2009) drew on ideas developed but not published by Sinclair,
which move the focus away from recurrent patterns toward the uniqueness
of each word combination. Sinclair proposed the meaning shift unit (MSU) as a
means of thinking in newways about collocations and lexical items, because “the
co-selection of the constituents causes a shift in the ambient meaning” (Sinclair,
quoted in Cheng et al., p. 237). This seems to echo Taylor’s (2002) view that
some measure of noncompositionality is the rule rather than the exception.5
The flexibility of concgrams has to be tempered by a means of managing the
output of the searches, something that continues to require human judgment
(W. Cheng, personal communication, July 2011) and entails sorting examples
into those that do and do not belong together. Sinclair’s approach, echoed in
the analytic procedures applied by Cheng et al. (2009), is that there is a single
canonical form of a word group (identified operationally by Cheng et al. as
the most frequent, which might be a point for future discussion), from which
variations arise with lesser and greater “degrees of turbulence” (p. 243). Cheng
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et al. illustrated the case with the co-occurrences of play and role and the con-
siderations required for including within the play/role MSU set a string like the
role he would play while excluding role playing exercises.
The assertion that words affect each other’s meanings dates back most fa-
mously to Firth (1957, p. 11) and no doubt much further, but is frequently re-
visited by commentators struggling to navigate the inherent complexities of
meaning within and between units of different sizes. For instance, Wulff (in
press) proposed that compositionality can be measured on the basis of “the
semantic similarity of the contexts of the construction compared with those of
its component words” (p. 10). Wulff hypothesized, and empirically confirmed,
that native speakers are sensitive to this measure. Meanwhile, Mollet, Wray, and
Fitzpatrick (2011) examined ways of capturing how the collocates of one word
are influenced by the presence or absence of another word in the co-text.
Collocations and Frequency
One link between discussions of collocation and discussions of frequency lies
in Sinclair’s doubt about the usefulness of counting word and collocate frequen-
cies:
It is not the statistical tests in themselves which are problematic; the
problem lies in not recognizing that whenwriters and speakers co-select
words, they create a new meaning which makes other instances of the
same individual words and other co-selections involving these same
words irrelevant. (Cheng et al., 2009, p. 237)
That is, Sinclair placed the burden of meaning so firmly in the local (semantic)
context that when a given word occurs with different collocates, it must be
considered a homograph (Cheng et al., 2009). This position inevitably throws
into grave question the usefulness of word as an operable concept in certain
kinds of linguistic study.
CONCLUSION
Why does a continuum of frequency not explain formulaicity more neatly than
it does? Why does it remain so extraordinarily difficult to work out where the
word fits into a picture of language as an emergent product of usage? The former
question is best addressed through the latter.We have seen in the preceding dis-
cussion howwords persistently confound attempts fully to isolate themwithout
loss of vital information. The attempt to isolate them at all, however, is premised
on the assumption that doing so is to restore something lost. According to Beck-
ner et al. (2009, p. 6), “articulatory patterns in speech indicate that as words
co-occur in speech, they gradually come to be retrieved as chunks.” I am not
sure that is entirely true. Articulatory patterns certainly indicate that there are
articulatory chunks, and that we are able to identify within them phonological
approximations of individual words that we also know. We certainly can spot
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individual words within the chunk, and we can normally identify the individual
words that, historically, have contributed to creating it. But that is all. It is a
matter of separating out what happened once from what happens now.
To argue that “the English contracted forms (I’m, they’ll) originate from the
fusion of co-occurring forms” (Beckner et al., 2009, p. 6) is not a problem, but this
historical process has turned them into words, albeit with complex meanings,
that are encountered as units in use. First language research indicates that
chunks of this sort are not broken down at once (Bannard & Lieven, 2009; Peters,
2009), with some never broken down at all (Wray, 2002). There is no need to
attribute to each individual user a stake in the process of chunking the words
into strings even if they do end up realizing they can be unchunked. Nor does
Bybee’s (2003; Bybee & Cacoullos, 2009) historically oriented account require or
necessarily imply it. But there is sometimes a discernible dissonance regarding
what is prefabricated, that is, already assembled when encountered, and what
is made formulaic through awareness of the behavior of the constituent units:
Corpus analyses in fact verify that communication largely consists of
prefabricated sequences, rather than an “open choice” among all avail-
ablewords . . . Such patterns could only exist if speakerswere registering
instances of co-occurring words, and tracking the contexts in which cer-
tain patterns are used. (Beckner et al., 2009, p. 6)
Again, I am not sure this is true. I think such patterns could also exist if
speakers were registering instances of the whole string, with a meaning, with
only a gradually emerging awareness that the string could be broken down into
(a full set of) components. I don’t think you need to know if you are talking about
a bare-faced lie or a bear-faced lie in order to knowwhat one is, and if the spelling
is immaterial because only the phonology matters, then it is not a matter of
registering co-occurring words, only co-occurring sounds. Alternatively, wemay
imagine that individuals attribute instances of this expression to the frequency
profile of one or the other word: bear or bare. Perhaps so, but not always, for
there are instances where people sit on the fence, such as not knowing whether
they should use a /k/ or /t/ in streets/streaks ahead and in off his own back/bat.
In this article I have not been trying to nit-pick at what are very solid and well-
thought-through developments in our understanding of formulaic sequences.
My primary concern is the ease with which claims made in one domain are often
adopted by those in another, without adequate recognition of the limitations
of what we know. We need to be careful about generalizations until we can
have more certainty about what an elephant looks like. As for the question of
what a word is, there is plenty more scope to examine the powerful effect of
our own acculturation into a literate, alphabetic world on what we think we are
observing. Words are more elusive than they ought to be, particularly when one
explores nonliterate cultures and languages written in characters (Wray, 2008),
and we must not get distracted by white spaces on the page, particularly given
the computer’s reliance on them in corpus searches. If Sinclair is right, the units
we need to be examining are less changeable than we have supposed at the level
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of lexical options, but more changeable in terms of their mutual arrangement:
moths dancing round a candle—we rarely see exactly the same thing twice.
Yet of course, we are pattern spotters. We know that language learning and
language knowledge are about extrapolation, not just listing. It would be more
than bizarre to set aside the vast body of evidence that has been amassed about
the regularities of language—regularities upon which our language use is evi-
dently based. The point is, to hijack Goldberg’s words yet again, it’s complicated
all the way down.6 The fact that we can go some way toward reducing language
learning and knowledge to a set of relatively simple processes, give or take some
noise, does not mean there is nothing else to explore or explain. We are meaning
makers, we are interactors andmanipulators—andwe are creative, too. If we are
sensitive to frequency and salience, if we can break things down and build things
up, if we use large units and small units, that is part of the story, but context is
more than just the words that collocate with other words. It is about who we
are and how we use language to express our identity and manipulate our world.
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NOTES
1 The terms included in the diagram are explained in the discussions later in the paper.
2 Of course, I am not the only one to notice that we have a complicated set of phenomena
here. Beckner et al.’s (2009) position paper on language as a complex adaptive system
is heavily influenced by observations directly pertaining to multiword constructions
and, thus, formulaic language.
3 “Mutual information: A statistical measure that compares the probability of finding
two items together to the probabilities of finding each item on its own” (Baker, Hardie,
& McEnery, 2006, p. 120).
4 “Dass Phraseologismen nicht nur Einheiten der Sprache sondern auch mit dem kul-
turellen System verbunden sind, ist jedoch eine alte Erkenntnis” (Ha¨cki Buhofer, 2006,
p. vii). [That formulaic expressions (phraseologisms) are not just units of language but
also bound up with the cultural system has been long since understood].
5 The primary thrust of Taylor’s point is that we cannot simply divide expressions
into two groups, noncompositional and compositional. However, he stated, “Most
expressions (I am tempted to say: all expressions), when interpreted in the context in
which they are uttered, are non-compositional to some degree,” (p. 550) which does
seem similar to Sinclair’s point.
6 Not, of course, Goldberg’s words, originally: for it is turtles all the way down (see the
start of chapter 1 in Stephen Hawking’s A Brief History of Time).
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